

# A Century of Revolution

## Social Movements in Iran

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## Chapter 2

### Social Democracy and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–11

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The Russian revolution of 1905 was followed by a series of revolutions in Iran (1906), Turkey (1908), Mexico (1910), and China (1911) that marked a new stage in the history of the developing world and brought several competing ideologies—nationalism, democracy, religion, and socialism—into open confrontation. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution is remembered most for its establishment of a parliament and a democratic constitution in the country for the first time. Less known are the roles of various social democratic tendencies that were active in Iran in this period. These groups, which became politically important organizations in their own right, are of crucial importance in an understanding of the course and development of the revolution. Moreover, the social and cultural aspects of the revolution, in which the social democrats played an active part, were not marginal and insignificant but rather at the very heart of the revolution, helping to define both the scope and the limitations of the movement.

The Constitutional Revolution was made possible through an initial hybrid coalition of forces, which included liberal reformers, members of the ulama, merchants, shopkeepers, students, trade guildspeople, workers, and radical members of secret societies who promoted the formation of an assembly of delegates and a constitution. This coalition was first formed during the tobacco protests of 1891–92, partially overcoming a long history of hostility and animosity between the religious/secular reformers and the orthodox members of the ulama.

Greater interaction with the capitalist world economy, and resentment over the increasing domination of Iran by the European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century, was a major contributor to the creation of this alliance, as well as to the revolutionary upheavals that followed in Iran in the beginning of the twentieth century. From the 1880s onward, Iran's trade with Europe increased substantially in response to the improved transportation system, new telegraph lines to Europe, the introduction of steamboats in the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and especially the opening of the Suez Canal. The European

demand for cotton, rice, fruit, silk, and opium had a significant impact on domestic agriculture, leading to a stress on cash crops at the expense of subsistence farming and manufactured products. Meanwhile, a variety of treaties signed with European countries, beginning with the 1813 Gulistan and 1828 Turkamanchay treaties with Russia, prohibited the establishment of protective measures that could have saved local industries in Iran. Ann Lambton, Charles Issawi, Nikki Keddie, and Willem Floor have argued that the transition from subsistence agriculture to the growing of cash crops, and the accompanying sale of *khalisah* crown lands to private landlords, a process that accelerated in the last decade of the nineteenth century, led to much material deterioration in the lives of the majority of the small merchants, artisans, and the peasants.<sup>1</sup> More recently, John Foran, following the Latin American dependency school, has argued that the process of development in Iran was a dependent development. It brought a degree of modernization to the country and even benefited some sectors of society in the short period, but in the long run, it was a type of development that served the interests of the foreign merchants rather than the native community and left the general population much worse off. Using Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system analysis, Foran argues that Iran, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, had moved from being a "non-European core" economy in the Safavid period to being part of the "periphery" of the world capitalist market.<sup>2</sup>

There were also important ideological components that cemented what Nikki Keddie has called the "religious-radical alliance" that ultimately brought forth the Constitutional Revolution.<sup>3</sup> The tendency in contemporary studies of this revolution has been to move away from some earlier interpretations that emphasized the leadership of the ulama and attributed their role to a strong sense of justice embedded in Shi'ite doctrines. Instead, new emphasis has been placed on the diversity of the coalition that made the revolution possible. Gad Gilbar has argued that it was the merchants, together with the members of the trade guilds, who initially supported the ulama and later held a *bast* (sit-in) at the British embassy. It was they who fought for and gained a constitution and a parliament along European lines.<sup>4</sup> Vanessa Martin emphasizes some of the economic factors that underlined the political alliances of the ulama in the revolutionary period. Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri, who soon sided with the opposition, handled the court's litigation, whereas Sayyid Abdullah Bihbahani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i had closer ties to the merchants and the guilds of Tehran.<sup>5</sup> Said Amir Arjomand has argued that the two ranking clerics, Bihbahani and Tabataba'i, hung back as the movement gradually came to call for a multiclass parliament and a secular constitution.<sup>6</sup> Three monographs published in the past two decades have shed new light on the organization of social democrats in Iran. Faridun Adamiyyat describes the involvement of social democrats with the Majlis (national assembly) and the peasant rebellions of the Caspian region and introduces the later writings of Muhammad Amin Rasolzadeh, an important theoretician of the Democrat

Party (1909-11). Mansureh Ittihadiyah Nizam Mafi uses private family archives to present new material on the role of political parties in this period. Nizam Mafi examines the contribution of the National Revolutionary Committee and the Democrat Party, whose leading members were social democrats. Mangol Bayat, using Russian sources, turns to the origins of the Iranian social democrats in the Russian Caucasus and describes their influence in the first constitutional period.<sup>7</sup>

Although some progressive members of the ulama joined the opposition because of their interest in liberalism and constitutionalism, many nonclerical groups joined for a variety of other reasons. First, the fiscal policies and foreign concessions of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-96) and Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) adversely affected the fortunes of the merchants, shopkeepers, and members of the trade guilds, as well as some of the ulama. This was especially true of the customs reforms of the years 1900-1905, enacted by the Belgian customs official Joseph Naus, which brought increased revenue to the royal court and favored the Russian merchants. Iranian merchants and their supporters, including some members of the ulama, now joined the nationalist alliance with the specific aim of ending foreign concessions.

Second, some of the orthodox members of the ulama who joined the movement in its very late stages, such as the conservative Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri, represented the popularity of modernist ideas and envisioned a "constitutional order" in which the rulings of the ulama and Shi'ite Islam were codified and elevated above those of both the government and the reformers. This conflict between *mashruteh* (constitutionalism) and *mashrua'eh* (rule according to the Shari'a) would arise soon after the formation of the parliament and the ratification of the constitution on December 30, 1906, and would haunt the revolutionary movement to the end.

Third, some members of the government, the landed elites, and some clerics, such as the supporters of former premier Amin al-Sultan, joined the coalition because they were motivated by the centuries-old politics of intrigue endemic among factions that were temporarily out of favor, and not out of reformist or revolutionary motives.

Fourth, and perhaps most important of all, the radical intellectuals and members of the secret societies encouraged the recruitment of both disgruntled orthodox members of the ulama and alienated politicians, seeing this as the only way to create a national coalition with broad mass appeal. This policy, as Nikki Keddie has argued, had been advocated since the 1890s by Malkum Khan and Jamal al-Din Afghani Asadabadi. Both Edward G. Browne, author of the classic *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, and Keddie have pointed out that most of the "religious" reformers who became active supporters of the Constitutional Revolution and called for the creation of a broad national front with the conservative ulama and politicians were in fact freethinkers and in some cases Azali Babis. The latter was true of Malik al-Mutikallimin, the leading orator of the

Constitutional Revolution, and Mirza Jahangir Khan Shirazi, the founder of the radical satirical paper *Sur-i Israfil* (1907–8), both of whom were executed after the June 1908 coup against the parliament in Tehran.<sup>8</sup> In a more recent study, Man-gol Bayat goes further and persuasively argues that there was a large network of religious dissidents, including many Azali Babi activists, who were involved throughout the revolutionary years. They pushed for the adoption of modern secular law and helped lead the calls for religious pluralism in the new order.<sup>9</sup>

But in order to understand the rapid radicalization of the movement in Iran after 1906, we have to take into account the bearers of yet another ideology, social democracy, and their political and social organizations. Social democratic societies began to have an important impact on the movement once the initial battle for a constitution and a parliament was won. Between 1906 and 1911, three major social democratic tendencies emerged in the country with the help of alliances with Azari and Armenian intellectuals.<sup>10</sup> These included (1) the *Firqa-yi Ijtima'iyun Amiiyun* (Organization of Iranian Social Democrats), which maintained its headquarters in Baku, Russia, whereas many branches, known as the *Anjumans of the Mujahidin*, were formed inside Iran after August 1906; (2) the *Tabriz Social Democrats*, mainly Armenians, who aligned themselves with the revolutionaries in Tabriz and helped lead the resistance against the army of Muhammad 'Ali Shah in 1908–9; and (3) the *Democrat Party*, formed during the second constitutional period of 1909–11, which had a social democratic program. The *Democrat Party* maintained a minority representation in the second parliament and joined the government in a coalition with the *Bakhtiari* tribal leaders in the summer of 1910.

The fact that the contribution of social democrats and religious dissidents has been so little acknowledged has had important political ramifications as well. In the 1960s and 1970s, radical intellectuals, including Jalal al-Ahmad and 'Ali Shari'ati, reiterated the commonly accepted claim that the alliance of two classes, "merchants" and members of the "ulama," brought about the Constitutional Revolution. They seemed to suggest a similar scenario in the struggle to overthrow the government of Muhammad Reza Shah and claimed an inherently progressive role for members of the ulama and Islamic theology in general. It was certainly true that many of the constitutionalists had important religious credentials, with several *mujtahids* among them, and that there were also many merchants in leading roles in the revolution. Radical intellectuals of the 1960s and 1970s failed to note, however, that many of these same people were in fact religious dissidents or social democrats who did not always make their ideological affiliations public. While the role of ranking clerics such as *Tabataba'i* and *Bihbahani*, as well as the ulama of Najaf, was certainly important in the struggle against the two Qajar shahs, the progressive agenda of the revolution during the years 1907–11 was put forth mainly by the social democrats. A number of factors, including a response to the crisis of modernization, fueled the revolution of 1978–79. But

the earlier revisionist historiography of the Constitutional Revolution that was articulated during the two decades before the revolution, an account that downplayed the secular and leftist elements of the revolution, took on concrete importance in 1978. It helped set the ideological context for the uncritical attitudes of liberals and radicals toward the ulama during the revolution of 1978, one that pushed *Khumaini* to the forefront of the revolutionary movement.

### The Organization of Iranian Social Democrats and the *Anjumans* of the *Mujahidin*

After more than a year of strikes and sit-ins, which culminated in the July 1906 *bast* at the British embassy in Tehran, Muzaffar al-Din Shah agreed to sign the royal proclamation of August 5, 1906, in which he granted the right to a constitution and parliament known as the *Majlis*. The Electoral Laws of September 9, 1906, gave limited representation to members of the Qajar tribe, the ulama and theological students, the urban notables, landowners and smallholders, merchants, and representatives of the trade guilds. Despite property limitations on both the voting and election of merchants, smallholders, and members of trade guilds, the inclusion of guild members in the parliament was a major achievement at the time. It was a result of the active participation of the guilds of Tehran in the *bast* at the British embassy. Half of the sixty-four delegates from Tehran were members of the guilds, and, together with the delegates from Azarbaijan, they became some of the most consistent supporters of the new order during the first constitutional period of 1906–8. A secular constitution, modeled after those of France and Belgium, was ratified on December 30, 1906, just before the king died and a hostile Muhammad 'Ali Shah took over the throne.

Meanwhile, a new and direct expression of democracy continued to grow in the streets—the grassroots *anjumans* (councils) that sprang up throughout the country after the August 1906 strikes. In the immediate prerevolutionary period of 1905 a few secret *anjumans* had been formed whose radical members called for the creation of an assembly and advocated alliances with disgruntled politicians and influential members of the ulama.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, the revolutionary *anjumans*, formed after August 1906, were open, active, and mass organizations that became organs of direct democracy. The Electoral Laws of September 1906 called for the formation of *anjumans* in local towns, as councils that would supervise the elections. But the *anjumans*, beginning with the *Tabriz Anjuman*, chose to remain in session after the elections, and soon became alternative organs of direct grassroots political participation, despite the protests of Crown Prince Muhammad 'Ali Mirza and other anticonstitutionalists.

One of the few achievements of the October 7, 1907, supplements to the constitution was to legalize these provincial *anjumans*. The provincial and departmental *anjumans* (in smaller provinces) supervised tax collection and monitored

the activities of the local governors. Hundreds of popular *anjumans* were also formed throughout the country in the late fall of 1906. The provincial and departmental *anjumans* maintained dual power with the parliament and the government, with the Tabriz Anjuman becoming the strongest and most vocal of such councils. The popular *anjumans* represented various social, political, trade, and class interests. Members of these *anjumans*—in which intellectuals, craftsmen, merchants, workers, and low-level clerics played prominent roles—began to both support and challenge the parliament on many fronts. The Tabriz Anjuman almost immediately confronted the major political institutions in the country, including the royal court, and established itself as an alternative government. Tabriz established the first independent newspaper, the *Anjuman*, reduced bread prices, fixed prices of other basic commodities, and began a secular system of education.<sup>12</sup>

The more liberal and left-wing councils, including the Tabriz Anjuman, had been influenced by the ideas of social democracy from the Russian Caucasus. Social democratic societies, many known as the Anjumans of the Mujahidin, were formed throughout the country. Members of these *anjumans* were mostly workers, craftsmen, and young activists from merchant families. The headquarters of the Anjumans of the Mujahidin (literally meaning "warriors of the jihad, or holy war") was the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats in Baku, which was composed primarily of Iranian immigrant workers and merchants. During the first years of the twentieth century there were several hundred thousand Iranian workers who, because of vast unemployment in Iran and greater economic opportunities in southern Russia, spent years there, often working in the Baku oil fields and their related industries.<sup>13</sup> Many of these workers were radicalized by the experience of the 1905 Russian revolution and the activities of the Azari social democratic organization Himmat, which was formed in 1904. The Organization of Iranian Social Democrats, which was founded in 1905, kept close ties with both the Himmat Party and the Baku and Tiflis committees of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (RSDWP). After the August 1906 revolution in Iran, the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats formed revolutionary cells of the Mujahidin inside Iran by sending some of its members to Iran. The Anjumans of the Mujahidin were especially active in the northern areas of Iran, such as Azarbaijan, the Caspian region, Tehran, and Mashhad. They involved themselves in the political affairs of the country, tilting the movement further to the left.

The Mujahidin, whose center in Tabriz was known as the Secret Center (Markaz-i Ghaybi), were in close collaboration with the Tabriz Anjuman. Among the more daring actions of the Tabriz Anjuman was the exile of two conservative clerics, the Imam Jum'ah (Leader of the Friday Prayer) and Haj Mirza Hasan Mujtahid, a leading local cleric and owner of several villages. In the spring of

1907, when peasants from a village near Tabriz known as Qarachaman (Black Grass) entered a dispute with the village owner, Haj Mirza Hasan Mujtahid sided with the landowner and sanctioned the governor's order to send two hundred armed men to the village to put down the rebellion. When the peasants took their grievances to the Tabriz Anjuman, some members of the *anjuman*, such as the radical low-ranking cleric Shaikh Salim, sided with the peasants. Haj Mirza Hasan Mujtahid and the conservative local landowners decided to force the radical members of the Tabriz Anjuman to leave town. But the radical Mujahidin turned the tables. With the support of 3,000 members of the Mujahidin, the conservative *mujtahid* and his supporters in the Tabriz Anjuman were expelled from town. The Tabriz Anjuman was reorganized, with the position of the left-wing members becoming more secure, and the Mujahidin developing a much closer relation to the Tabriz Anjuman. The Majlis in Tehran was outraged by the actions of the Tabriz Anjuman, and the ulama in Tabriz began to boycott the meetings of the Tabriz Anjuman. Both, however, found that the Tabriz Anjuman ignored repeated calls for the return of the exiled clerics.<sup>14</sup>

In Tehran, as in Tabriz, the Mujahidin were active in confrontations with the conservative ulama who opposed the secular constitution and the progressive measures that the Majlis adopted. The anticonstitutionalist Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri opposed the free press of the constitutional era, including journals such as *Sur-i Israfil* (1907-8), which advocated fundamental social and cultural changes in society. Dihkhuda, the radical satirical poet and editor of *Sur-i Israfil*, mocked religious superstitions, belief in predestination, and patriarchal traditions that degraded women and children. This important cultural movement, initiated by the newspapers of this period, was intensified by the participation of a number of urban women. Some activist women formed their own *anjumans* and schools, and called upon the Majlis to recognize and support these institutions.<sup>15</sup>

The Tabriz Anjuman and the Mujahidin would play an important role when new supplements to the constitution were proposed. The supplements, which were originally formulated by the Tabriz Anjuman and the prominent left-wing delegate from Azarbaijan, Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh, were essentially a bill of rights, guaranteeing freedom of the press and of organization, and calling for equal treatment of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation. They were meant to solidify the gains that were made during the course of the revolution. But the conservative opposition, headed by Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri and backed by Muhammad 'Ali Shah, had a different set of supplements in mind. Shaikh Fazlullah proposed a Council of Ulama with veto power over the deliberations of the Majlis, and demanded that this council be given the authority to determine the compatibility of any law submitted to the Majlis with the laws of the Shari'a. The Tabriz Anjuman and the Mujahidin were infuriated by this idea of a Council of Ulama proposed as Article 2 of the supplements to the constitution. A stream of angry

letters from Tabriz attacked the conservative ulama and criticized the delegates in the Majlis for not confronting Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri and his followers more vigorously. In late May 1907, one telegram to the Majlis read:

We want a constitution that would determine the limits of a constitutional monarchy and the rights of people. Otherwise, the Shari'a of Muhammad is protected and in place and everyone knows their religious duties. We loudly proclaim that unless you sign and give to the nation the constitution which was written by the learned representatives and others and has been completed, we will lose patience, and will say what should not be said.<sup>16</sup>

A general strike continued in Tabriz in May and June 1907 and spread throughout the province of Azarbaijan, including many small towns and villages. The strike was embraced by tribal groups and minorities, including the Armenians, who were strong supporters of the Tabriz Anjuman. Despite these protests, the Majlis gave in to the pressures by Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri and the royal court and ratified Article 2. Residents of Tabriz were outraged. Rumors began to spread that Tabriz might take independent action and create a republic of its own.<sup>17</sup>

The Mujahidin and the Tabriz Anjuman continued to call for major social and economic reforms and began to oppose the conservative chief minister, Amin al-Sultan. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Agreement was signed, in which Iran was effectively partitioned into spheres of influence by the two powers. On the same day, Amin al-Sultan was shot as he left the parliament. The two events were not directly connected, even though Amin al-Sultan had been the architect of two unpopular Russian loans in 1900 and 1902, much of which had been wasted on Muzaffar al-Din Shah's extravagant trips to Europe, and in August 1907 Amin al-Sultan had been very close to gaining a majority in the Majlis to ratify the proposal for yet another unpopular Russian loan.<sup>18</sup> The assassination of Amin al-Sultan was carried out by a young merchant known as 'Abbas Aqa, a member of the Mujahidin, who belonged to the small secret circle of Fada'is ("devotees" within the organization, or those willing to sacrifice themselves for the cause). The Mujahidin had opposed the new chief minister ever since he set foot in Iran in the spring of 1907. They had criticized the Majlis delegates for supporting Amin al-Sultan, and called for new elections to that assembly.<sup>19</sup> The assassination of Amin al-Sultan strengthened the radical and liberal factions in the Majlis and dried up a major source of support for Shaikh Fazlullah Nuri and other opponents of the Majlis.

The formation of *anjumans* in small towns and villages had been opposed by the Majlis, and specific directives were issued calling for the closing of these *anjumans*. At the same time, in northern provinces of the Caspian region and Azarbaijan, rent strikes continued among villagers, and a variety of peasants' and craftsmen's *anjumans* were formed. In the spring of 1907, cocoon growers of the city of Rasht, the center of Iran's silk trade, organized a rent strike and

expelled both landlords and overseers from their villages. In the year that followed, a series of peasants' and craftsmen's *anjumans* known as the 'Abbasi Anjumans were established, with fourteen branches in the provinces of Gilan. In Tavalash, by the Caspian Sea, villagers gained autonomous control of the area for several years. They expelled the governor and local landowner, and in the summer of 1908 successfully resisted a military expedition financed by Sardar Afkham, the Gilan governor, and Muhammad 'Ali Shah.<sup>20</sup>

As a result, ministers complained to the Majlis in 1907 that they no longer had control over their land, as villagers had taken over and expelled their overseers or joined the organizations of the Mujahidin, calling themselves Fada'is.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, the Majlis came under increasing pressure from radical intellectuals, members of the Mujahidin, and some peasants to abolish the *uyul* land allotment.<sup>22</sup> Many people believed that the solution to both the problem of peasant poverty and the budget deficit was extensive land reform. But the tax and land reforms the parliament adopted in the early spring of 1907 were aimed at balancing the deficit-ridden budget and improving the treasury rather than ameliorating the situation of the peasants. No provisions for distribution or sale of land to the peasants or steps to lessen government taxes were taken by the First Majlis.

The grievances of peasants and workers were addressed by the Anjumans of the Mujahidin in a program they adopted in the fall of 1907. By this time, according to British intelligence accounts reported in the Persian daily *Habl al-Matin*, the number of Mujahidin had grown to more than 86,000, and secret networks of the Anjumans of the Mujahidin had been formed in Tehran, Tabriz, Ardabil, Khuy, Mashhad, Isfahan, Qazvin, Rasht, Anzali, and other cities.<sup>23</sup>

The first party congress of the Mujahidin was held in early September 1907 in the northern city of Mashhad in the province of Khurasan. What social democracy, or *Jitima'iyyun 'Amiyyun*, meant as an ideology to the organization of the Mujahidin can perhaps best be seen through the proceedings of this congress. Whereas the program of the Mujahidin called for active support of liberalism and constitutionalism in Iran, it also enumerated a number of socialist principles that addressed workers' and peasants' rights. The Mujahidin's declared support for the Majlis and the constitution was based on the condition that the elected deputies uphold justice and "introduce equalities." They also recognized themselves as an indispensable part of the constitutional regime. The preservation of constitutionalism in Iran, the program declared, depended on an active populace, one that joined the Anjumans of the Mujahidin, through which the events in the Majlis were closely monitored. The Mujahidin shared a commitment to social revolution with their mentors, the Russian Social Democrats, but at the same time they were equally committed to selective acts of political terror.

The program of the Mujahidin drew justification for political activism from Qur'anic precepts and declared the very aims of the Anjumans of the Mujahidin as sacred. The degree of religiosity among the Mujahidin varied, however, with

those who came from the Caucasus generally known to be less religious than those recruited inside Iran.

In calling for universal (male) suffrage "without regard for position, nationality, poverty, or wealth," the Mujahidin challenged the limited franchise of the Majlis. The most radical articles of the program were a six-point bill of rights, provisions for land distribution, and a call for limitations on the working day. Individual freedom and freedom of speech, publication, and association, as well as the right to strike, were explicitly defined. The right to strike, it was emphasized, belonged to workers regardless of the issues involved, be they "private, general, or political." The Mujahidin also demanded an eight-hour day, a first in Iran's history. Finally, provisions for land distribution were discussed. Crown lands and villages belonging to the royal family were to be expropriated without compensation, and those belonging to private landowners (exceeding the land needed for the maintenance of the owners) were to be bought through a national bank and distributed among the peasants and agricultural workers.<sup>24</sup>

In February 1908, the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats and the Mujahidin were implicated in an assassination attempt against the shah. On December 15, 1907, Muhammad 'Ali Shah and Shaikh Fazlullah had tried to carry out a coup against the Majlis. A large number of anticonstitutionalists, including both clerics and low-level employees of the court, had surrounded the Majlis, but the attempted coup quickly failed as members of the *arjuman*s came out to support the Majlis. A thousand members of the Mujahidin in Tabriz stated that they were ready to come to Tehran. The Tabriz Anjuman arrested Iqbal Lashgar, the ranking military officer in Azarbaijan. Other Azarbaijani officers and soldiers in the service of the shah were warned that if they fought against the Majlis, the province of Azarbaijan would declare its independence and the Mujahidin would take their revenge upon the relatives of the Azari military men in Tehran.<sup>25</sup>

The coup in Tehran failed, in part as a result of the activities of the Tabriz Anjuman and the Mujahidin. Then, on February 28, 1908, Muhammad 'Ali Shah was nearly assassinated as he left his palace for the first time in months. The *arjuman* of Azarbaijan in Tehran was once again accused. Haydar Khan Amu Ughlu, an active member of the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats, was briefly arrested but soon released because of popular pressure.<sup>26</sup>

### The Tabriz Social Democrats

The high point of the activity of the Mujahidin came during the civil war in Tabriz. When the parliament in Tehran was closed by a coup in June 1908, it was the city of Tabriz that led the resistance. The story of the ten-month siege of Tabriz, which ended with Russian military intervention on April 29, 1909, is one of the most moving chapters in twentieth-century Iranian history. Despite the ongoing war, the Tabriz Anjuman, which had replaced the Majlis as the center of consti-

tutionalism in Iran, gained both national and international recognition for keeping the revolutionary spirit alive. This was made possible through the support of the Mujahidin, who continued to resist at a time when many leading constitutionalist figures had either left the country or gone into hiding. Sattar Khan, an illiterate horse dealer in his forties who had been recruited as a rank-and-file member of the Mujahidin with the responsibility of protecting the Tabriz Anjuman, emerged as the uncontested revolutionary leader of this period, fighting against both the Azarbaijani anticonstitutionalist clerics and the army of the central government.

Prominent members of the European Social Democrats such as Karl Kautsky, George Plekhanov, and V. I. Lenin, were asked by Iranian intellectuals in exile to support the struggling movement in Iran. Because of the role of the Russian Cossack Brigade in carrying out the June 1908 coup, the RSDWP considered the defense of the resistance movement inside Iran to be part of its struggle against the tsarist government.

The most crucial and direct support, however, came from revolutionaries from the Russian Caucasus, among them more than five hundred Armenians, Georgians, and Azari socialists. Together with the aid of volunteers known as Caucasian revolutionaries, many of whom were in fact Iranian immigrants returning home, the Tabriz activists organized an army of workers, artisans, peasants, theological students, and some tribesmen, as well as women fighters. These forces were also known as the Mujahidin, as the term had come to encompass all revolutionaries who fought on the side of the constitutional cause. Once the resistance movement in Tabriz gained the upper hand, democracy returned to the streets, the Tabriz Anjuman was reorganized, schools were reopened, hospitals were organized, and public bakeries were established for the poor.

The leadership of the resistance in Tabriz was held by a committee composed of Sattar Khan, his colleague the stone mason Baqir Khan, other members of the Tabriz Anjuman, and radical social democrats and Armenian Dashnaks who had joined the Tabriz constitutionalists both from within Iran and from the Russian Caucasus. The Tiflis and the Baku branches of the RSDWP sent volunteer fighters to Tabriz, including Azari, Georgian, and Armenian revolutionaries. The Georgians set up a laboratory for explosives, which gave the revolutionary side a decisive technological advantage in the war.<sup>27</sup> Armenian members of both the Dashnak Party and the Hnchack Social Democratic Party were also active in the resistance movement in Azarbaijan and Gilan. Two members of the Dashnak Party—Stepan Zoranian, known as Rustam, and Yephrem Khan—would play important parts in the leadership of the movement. The revolutionaries in Gilan would later move toward Tehran under the leadership of Yephrem Khan and reinstitute the constitutional government.<sup>28</sup>

In 1909, the Russian social democrat and Bolshevik G. K. Orjonikidze, an active supporter of the Himmat and the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats,

came to Rasht as head of a detachment of Caucasian Bolsheviks and secretly helped organize a political club that distributed Marxist literature.<sup>29</sup> In addition, Mikhail Pavlovitch, the influential Russian social democrat who lived in Paris at the time, was in close contact with the Iranian émigré society. As one of the best-informed European socialists in matters related to Iran, Pavlovitch often contributed articles on the Iranian situation to journals he collaborated with, among them *Social Demokrat*, *Golos Social Demokrata*, *Neue Zeit*, and *Revue du Monde Musulman*.<sup>30</sup>

The tsarist government was outraged by the support that the resistance movement in Iran received from Russian and Caucasian revolutionaries. *Novoye Vremya*, organ of the deeply conservative Russian Black Hundred, openly called upon the tsarist government to intervene militarily in Azarbaijan:

Whether Russia can endlessly tolerate these outrages, which are ruining our lucrative trade on the Persian frontier ... it should be borne in mind that all Eastern Transcaucasia and Aderbaijan [Azarbaijan] are an ethnological whole. ... Tatar semi-intellectuals in Transcaucasia, forgetting that they are Russian subjects, have displayed warm sympathy for the disturbances in Tabriz and are sending volunteers to that city.

... *What is much more important for us* is that Aderbaijan, which borders on Russia, should be pacified. Deplorable though it may be, circumstances might compel Russia, despite her strong desire not to interfere, to take this task upon herself.<sup>31</sup>

The social democrats of Tabriz soon formed their own political organization and began to debate the future course of development of Iran according to social democratic principles.

Ever since 1905, a group of Armenian social democrats had existed in Tabriz. During the civil war their ranks were bolstered by some of the Caucasian social democrats who had joined the resistance and who now also participated in the political activities and debates of this group. In mid-July 1908 Arshavir Chalangarian, an Iranian-Armenian member of the group, wrote a letter to Kautsky, informing him of an impending conference that was to take up the organization's political and theoretical perspectives on the revolutionary movement in Iran. Chalangarian wrote that there were two political tendencies in the group and asked Kautsky to take a position on the analyses presented by the two wings.<sup>32</sup> Everyone seemed to have agreed, he wrote, that the process of capitalist development was a necessary prerequisite of the creation of a class of industrial workers and, eventually, a socialist revolution in Iran. However, members of the group differed in their assessment of the Constitutional Revolution as a means of achieving this end. The main question thus became the following: Should the young Iranian social democrats be active in the democratic movement, or should they also agitate for social democracy in the midst of the Constitutional Revolution?

Kautsky replied that the Iranian social democrats must participate actively in the democratic movement *alongside* bourgeois and petty bourgeois democrats, even though the ultimate aim of the struggle for the socialists was a class struggle. The Iranian Marxists were asked to wait for the "triumph of democracy," when new avenues would open to them, including "new struggles that were virtually impossible to wage under the previous despotic rule." Kautsky referred to Marx's participation in the 1848 revolution alongside the democratic movement, as an example of a situation in which there was "no chance of establishing a strong proletarian party in Germany."<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, although acknowledging the great hardship for the masses of the peasants in Iran who were taxed heavily and were thus "unable to buy industrial goods," Kautsky extended his own questionable views of the European peasantry, which were challenged by several leading social democrats of the time, such as Rosa Luxemburg, to the mostly tenant Iranian peasantry.<sup>34</sup> He thus wrote off the "small peasants," putting them alongside the "petty bourgeoisie" as elements that brought "reactionary tendencies" to the democratic movement, and insisted that the peasants needed to be confronted by the social democrats.

Kautsky's letter to the Tabriz Social Democrats resulted in certain modifications to their program, for example, the dropping of a reference to the progressive nature of foreign investments. However, in a subsequent conference the left wing of the Tabriz group challenged Kautsky's notion of stages of the revolutionary movement in Iran and his emphasis on first bringing forth the "triumph of democracy" before they would begin to struggle openly as social democrats.

On October 16, 1908, after the initial victory of the Tabriz Mujahidin over the royalist army of 'Ain al-Daula, the conference of the Tabriz Social Democrats, with thirty participants, took place. The secretary of the meeting was Vasu Khachaturian, an Armenian from the Russian Caucasus, who on August 28, 1908, had brought a group of social democrats from the Baku branch of the RSDWP with him to Tabriz. Khachaturian was also active with the Azarbaijani workers and was instrumental in establishing the fledgling trade union movement in Tabriz.

The two different political tendencies in the conference presented their proposals at this meeting. A majority view, which was to the left of Kautsky's proposal, was presented by Arshavir Chalangarian and Vasu Khachaturian and was ratified by twenty-eight votes. The minority view, presented by Sedrak and Pilusian, received only two votes. It is almost certain that this Pilusian was Vram Pilusian, who later became a close colleague of Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh, the prominent left-wing delegate of the Majlis and leader of the influential Democrat Party during the second constitutional period. Pilusian, who would also play an active part in the organization of the Democrat Party, corresponded with Taqizadeh over the organizational details of the party in early 1909.<sup>35</sup>

The majority proposal argued that Iran had entered the stage of manufacturing and industrial production, as seen in the introduction of the steam engine, tobacco companies, cotton cleaning plants, and other innovations. The nation had thus developed a small class of industrial workers alongside its larger class of small artisans. Therefore, the foundation for socialist agitation already existed in the nation. If social democrats abandoned the industrial workers, there was a possibility that the workers would become a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie for its domination. On the other hand, the examples of the European revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848, as well as that of Iran, had demonstrated that the most revolutionary sectors of society were the propertyless elements. Therefore, the role of social democrats, in addition to their general struggle in the Constitutional Revolution, was "to fight for the social and economic progress of the revolutionary masses and the propertyless masses," all the more so because the very low wage levels of Iranian workers prevented the introduction of full-scale industrial development in the nation. The responsibility of social democrats was to mobilize the small strata of industrial workers and "to give them class consciousness for the socialist struggle." Socialists could not proceed as bourgeois democrats, because they had a different worldview, and their concept of democracy differed from the "mere democracy" of the bourgeoisie; moreover, "a socialist who maintained his class analysis of the [role of the] proletariat could succeed much further in the bourgeois revolution." The Tabriz Social Democrats voted to organize a "permanent social democratic group" to agitate among workers and intellectuals for a class struggle in Iran.<sup>36</sup>

According to the minority proposal, Iran had only recently entered the capitalist stage. There were no modern industrial workers and thus no foundation for social democratic work. Even if there were such industrial workers, the objective and subjective conditions were not yet ripe for such organizing. Under such circumstances, agitation among workers for socialism was not only useless, but would deprive the democratic movement of its most radical elements and throw them into the arms of "reaction" by creating disunity in the democratic struggle. The success of the bourgeois revolution was essential, and it was the responsibility of social democrats to "abandon momentarily purely social democratic work," to enter the democratic movement to "cleanse it of reactionary tendencies," to cooperate in its ranks, and to struggle as the most radical elements within it. These activists foresaw the emergence of a class struggle only after the successful democratic revolution was won. This, they argued, did not mean that individuals would abandon their social democratic ideology, "their conception of the world and its principles," because the position adopted by the group was "a matter of politics and wise tactics and not a matter of principles."<sup>37</sup>

Vasu Khachaturian and Arshavir Chalangarian, on behalf of the majority, and Tigran Darvish, an Iranian-Armenian representative of the minority from Geneva, each sent copies of the minutes of the meeting to Plekhanov and asked for his

opinion. Khachaturian asked Plekhanov to share his letter with both the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of the RSDWP, and Chalangarian asked that Azaris from the Baku branch of the RSDWP join them in their task of spreading the ideas of social democracy among the population in Tabriz.

Of particular interest are the letters by Chalangarian and Khachaturian, who expressed their disagreements with the course of action prescribed by Kautsky.<sup>38</sup> They informed Plekhanov of the close relationship of the group with the residents and workers of Tabriz, pointing to a rally of the social democrats in early December 1908 that had drawn a crowd of 10,000, including Sattar Khan himself, and noted that social democrats were consulted on all matters by the Tabriz Anjuman and leaders of the Mujahidin.

Khachaturian argued that some Azarbaijani workers had shown interest in both the political and economic aspects of social democracy. The Tabriz Social Democrats, who until then had pursued mostly political objectives, now also turned their attention to economic and trade union activities, and Khachaturian argued that the formation of a workers' trade union would facilitate the creation of political organizations among the workers: A powerful trade union movement could confront a hostile but largely unorganized "bourgeoisie," thus helping to maintain the achievements of the revolutionary period.

Khachaturian challenged Kautsky's suggestions that if "the economic situation of the country has not yet created a modern industrial proletariat, the socialists must unite themselves with the democratic movement in the revolutionary struggle." The breakup of the old system and its replacement with capitalism had already begun in the country, he wrote, and "the process of proletarianization of workers proceeds with great speed among the artisans." It was true that Iran's economy had not yet created a class of modern industrial workers in the European sense, but there were many other laborers in Iran "who do not own their means of production and sell their labor power or knowledge to the owners." What then were the social democrats to do? Should they *not* agitate among the workers, *not* organize them, *not* struggle for higher wages, and, if so, how would they then force the capitalists and managers to adopt a more modern system of production? The exceedingly low wages of Iranian workers meant that even in the face of world competition, capitalists felt no need to import modern machinery. The fight for higher wages, Khachaturian argued, meant the introduction of a more sophisticated stage of capitalism in Iran, which in turn brought about a more advanced industrial worker. And yet disagreements over this issue among Tabriz Social Democrats had resulted in several members leaving the majority and establishing their own tendency.<sup>39</sup>

Given the very small number of industrial workers in Iran in this period, it is surprising that the relationship of the Tabriz Social Democrats to the large peasant population and the continuing peasant protests in the north were not addressed in the congress. Perhaps this was because of Kautsky's letter, which had

discouraged any discussion of the peasantry and alliances with them, calling them "petit-bourgeois" elements that had to be confronted. Both wings of the tendency were well aware of continuing peasant protests in Azarbaijan and Gilan. Tigran Darvish, who sided with the minority "Democrat" wing of the group, in his February 1909 article "Die Persische Revolution," published in the authoritative German socialist journal *Neue Zeit*, traced landlord-peasant relations in prerevolutionary Iran and pointed out that vast peasant movements were continuing in the country: "In the recent period, general principles of freedom, equal rights, and land questions have become issues of primary concern. Villagers, especially in Azarbaijan, the province where Tabriz is located, rise up every day and begin peasant revolts."<sup>40</sup> Arshavir Chalangarian, who represented the majority left wing of the Tabriz Social Democrats, wrote in *Neue Zeit* in May 1909: "In Iran we do not see a land crisis as powerful as that of Russia. However, will the peasants who have refused to pay taxes and have appropriated the land and property of big landowners be content with political reforms alone? The near future will teach us the answer to this question."<sup>41</sup>

In contrast to the Mujahidin, who had shown great interest in issues related to the peasantry, the question of the relation of the Tabriz Social Democrats to the peasant revolts was prematurely abandoned by these young intellectuals. The issue of organizing workers and peasants was taken up briefly in 1911, especially by Tigran Darvish, who had earlier been a member of the minority "Democrat" wing of the group. Once Darvish arrived in Tehran and joined the editorial board of the organ of the Democrat Party, *Iran-i Nau*, however, he quickly began to criticize the inaction of the majority of the Democrat members and helped create workers trade unions in Tehran. As we shall see, these efforts were minimal and in no significant way altered the course of action of the Democrat Party, which had been quickly dragged into the quagmire of party politics and maneuvers for coalition building with the Bakhtiari tribal leaders, leaving behind its social and economic reform programs.

### The Democrat Party

In July 1909, the Mujahidin fighters of Gilan, whose ranks were bolstered by Caucasian revolutionaries, together with Bakhtiari tribesmen from the south, marched toward the capital and reestablished the constitutional government. Muhammad 'Ali Shah was expelled from the country and replaced by his twelve-year-old son Ahmad, and the Second Majlis was formed. The prominent left-wing delegate from Azarbaijan, Sayyid Hasan Taqizadeh, then helped form the influential Democrat Party, a coalition of liberals and social democrats, which gained a minority representation of between twenty and thirty delegates in the Second Majlis, out of 111 delegates. The Democrats opened branches of the party in the provinces and gained many recruits among the youth. Several members of

the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats in Baku joined the Democrat Party, among them the Azari intellectual Rasulzadeh, who, soon after his arrival from the Russian Caucasus, became editor of *Iran-i Nau*, later the organ of the party. Haydar Khan Amu Ughlu now headed the executive section of the party. He gathered a number of the radical Mujahidin under his command, and was in charge of carrying out acts of political terror.<sup>42</sup> The Democrats were not affiliated with the Organization of Iranian Social Democrats in Baku; rather, there was close collaboration between leaders of the Democrat Party, especially Taqizadeh, with the minority wing of the Tabriz Social Democrats, Armenian intellectuals such as Vram Pilusian, and Tigran Darvish.<sup>43</sup> Throughout their existence, the Democrats kept their ties to the Armenian social democrats secret. Together they proposed a new program of reform for the country that emphasized economic growth and secularization of politics.

To some extent the differences between the two wings of the Tabriz Social Democrats represented the divisions that had emerged within the radical wing of the constitutional movement as a whole. It included the social democratic leadership, which now aligned itself with the liberal as well as influential politicians in the establishment, and the rank-and-file Mujahidin and the grassroots *anjumans*, who had made victory possible but now grew more estranged from the leadership.

The Democrats saw their task as one of accelerating the development of Iran from an "outmoded feudal order" to a new and more advanced capitalist one. The party program reflected the desire for a capitalist state and called for a number of social reform programs for the workers and craftsmen, as well as peasants. Economic development and social reform were vehicles that paved the way for the emergence of a socialist order in the distant future. The new economic order in Iran was to be based on the three principles of "centralism, parliamentarianism, and democracy."<sup>44</sup> The country needed a strong central government that would end the regional control of the powerful khans and tribal leaders and that would initiate a program of industrialization, enabling Iran to challenge foreign economic penetration.

In adopting some provisions from the earlier 1907 program of the Mujahidin, the Democrats included a broad range of civil rights in their program, such as freedom of expression, publication, and association; equality before the law for all Iranians, regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion; and the right to strike. Free compulsory education for all, including women, was also stipulated. In a challenge to the 1907 supplements to the constitution that had given extraordinary powers to a Council of Ulama, Article 5 of the Democrats' program called for the separation of politics from religion. This strong emphasis on secularization of politics, which was a break with the old program of the Mujahidin, resulted in many innuendos against the Democrats, who were labeled "atheists" and "non-Muslims" by the opposition.

The program of the Democrat Party called for nationalization of rivers, forests

and pastures, and supported direct rather than indirect taxation. It required a minimum age of fourteen for workers and called for the abolition of forced labor. It also proposed to limit the working day to ten hours and the working week to six days, and suggested the installation of safe machinery and equipment in workshops and factories. Finally, a good portion of the program, seven articles, was devoted to the regulation of relations between landlords and peasants, attesting to the strong belief of the party that "feudal" relations of production had to give way to new capitalist ones.

But the program of the Democrat Party remained largely on paper. Even when it seemed they could have, the Democrats never pushed for its implementation. This was the case during the summer and fall of 1910, when the Democrats joined the Bakhtiari tribal leaders in a coalition government. During this period, a number of factors increased the public's sense of resentment and alienation toward the Second Majlis and the Democrats. A much-despised salt tax, which benefited no one but the tax collectors, became a key factor adding fuel to this sense of indignation.

Sattar Khan, Baqir Khan, and the Mujahidin in their service, as well as many of the Mujahidin from Gilan who had helped reinstitute the constitutional order in Tehran, were shunned by the Democrats and their Bakhtiari allies. Disillusioned by the Democrats and the Bakhtiaris, Sattar Khan and some of the Mujahidin were now courted by the conservative Moderate Party. Together with the help of Sayyid Abdullah Bihbahani and the Najaf ulama, this group accused Taqizadeh of conduct that was "in conflict with the Muslim characteristics of the nation and the holy Shari'a laws," and barred him from the Majlis on July 2, 1910.<sup>45</sup>

Two weeks later, on July 15, 1910, Sayyid Abdullah Bihbahani was assassinated by several members of the Mujahidin who were under the command of Haydar Khan Amu Ughlu, member of the Democrat Party. Bihbahani had been an early supporter of the constitutional revolution—some have suggested more because of factional and personal conflicts with the government of 'Ain al-Daula than because of any strong commitment to the constitutional cause. His death resulted in much public anger. On August 1, the Moderates retaliated against the Democrats and assassinated two close associates of the Democrat Party, including 'Ali Muhammad Tarbiyat, Taqizadeh's nephew, who had been designated head of the Mujahidin in Tehran.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, the Democrats were implicated in the assassination of Bihbahani, and Taqizadeh was forced to leave for Istanbul on August 9, 1910.<sup>47</sup>

On August 7, 1910, encouraged by the Russian and British governments, the Bakhtiari-Democrat cabinet retaliated and forcibly disarmed those members of the Mujahidin who had held sanctuary under the command of Sattar Khan. Among the military officers on the government side were the Dashnak Armenian leader Yephrem Khan, who was now chief of police of Tehran, and the social democrat

Haydar Khan Amu Ughlu.<sup>48</sup> The public became disillusioned and resentful as watched the former revolutionary leaders killing one another. Meanwhile, neither the Democrats and the Bakhtiaris nor the more conservative Moderates had now aligned themselves with the former revolutionary leaders of Tabriz and Gilan proposed any steps to improve the deteriorating economic and political situation. After several years of close collaboration between the Muslims and the Armenians in the constitutional movement, new anti-Armenian hostilities broke out as chief of police Yephrem Khan was criticized, especially as the shoot-out had left Sattar Khan, the popular hero of the Tabriz resistance, disabled.<sup>49</sup>

The showdown between the Mujahidin of Sattar Khan and supporters of the Democrat Party in 1910 signaled the beginning of the end of the constitution movement, which was now bereft of much of its mass support. This facilitated the political maneuvers of both the Russian and British governments, which ever since the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement had tried to curb the powers of the Majlis. With the appointment of the new regent, Nasir al-Mulk, and the subsequent ascendancy of the conservatives in the Majlis in the winter of 1911, several leading Azari social democrats were expelled from the country. The British ultimatum, demanding the institution of its military forces in the south of Iran and the Russo-German Potsdam meeting in the fall of 1910 increased the involvement of the two powers in Iran. The arrival of the American financial adviser Morgan Shuster in May 1911 briefly helped to revive the Democrat Party but the Tsarist government, which resented the financial reforms and appointments instituted by Shuster, gave an ultimatum to the Majlis calling for Shuster's expulsion. This was done with the support of the British government. The Russian government followed this ultimatum by moving its military forces further into Azarbaijan and Gilan. Russian forces waited in Qazvin, just outside Tehran, as the cabinet continued to pressure the Majlis into accepting the ultimatum. However, until the very end nearly all the Democrats refused to accept the ultimatum, whereby Iran would become a de facto colony of the two powers and the Majlis would surrender its independence. Finally, Regent Nasir al-Mulk and his cabinet closed down the Majlis on December 24, 1911, bringing the constitutional era to an end.

## Conclusion

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 brought forth a new type of grassroots democracy not only among the middle-class male city dwellers, but also among craftsmen, workers, and peasants, as well as some urban women circles. New ideas of social democracy came to influence many of these *arjuman*, as well as the courses of action of new political institutions, such as the Majlis. With the help of Armenian and Azari radicals, three social democratic tendencies were formed in Iran during the years 1906-11. The Organization of Iranian

Social Democrats in Baku opened branches of that organization in Iran known as the Anjumans of the Mujahidin after the 1906 royal proclamation. The Mujahidin's support was critical both to the newly formed parliament and to the provincial, departmental, and popular councils, especially the ones that were formed in the northern regions. The Mujahidin called for a program of land distribution and pressured the First Majlis into addressing the issue. In the early spring of 1907 the Majlis carried out a series of land reforms, including the abolition of *tuyul* land allotment. But these measures only boosted the authority of the central government and helped its depleted treasury rather than improving the situation of the peasants, who were conducting a campaign of resistance against landholders and government tax collectors in the northern provinces of Gilan and Azarbaijan.

After Muhammad 'Ali Shah's coup against the parliament in June 1908, Tabriz emerged as the new center of resistance. The Tabriz Anjuman and the Mujahidin, headed by Sattar Khan, controlled the city. A group of mainly Armenian social democrats, some of them revolutionaries from the Caucasus, were officers in the army of the Mujahidin and helped lead the resistance against Muhammad 'Ali Shah and the conservative clerics in 1908-9. By the fall of 1908, the social democratic leadership of the Mujahidin, the Tabriz Social Democrats, was divided in its assessment of the future direction of the movement. These divisions among Armenian and Muslim participants were not along ethnic lines, but rather represented political and ideological disagreements. Despite their small numbers, the Tabriz Social Democrats, especially the minority wing, would have an important influence on the course of events in Tehran once the constitutional order was reestablished.

In the second constitutional period, the Democrat Party, a coalition of liberals and social democrats with a social democratic program, was formed. The Democrat Party held a minority but vocal representation in the parliament and eventually entered a coalition government in the summer of 1910. The Democrat Party proposed a series of progressive laws and a minor land reform program. However, the reality of coalition politics with the more conservative Bakhtiari tribal leaders prevented the Democrats from carrying out these proposals, and instead further distanced them from the radical grassroots forces. Conflicts between the Democrats and some of the Mujahidin headed by Sattar Khan, who was now courted by the conservative Moderate Party, reached the breaking point. Once the Bakhtiari-Democrat government forcibly disarmed the Mujahidin, the coalition that made the conquest of Tehran possible fell apart. In November 1911, the Russian government, with extensive British support, gave an ultimatum that eventually resulted in a coup against the Majlis and the end of the constitutional order. The social, political, and ideological issues that the Constitutional Revolution had brought to the surface would not disappear, however. A decade later,

they would resurface during the Jangali (forest) movement, which, together with the Russian revolution of 1917, would bring new momentum to the movement in Iran.

#### Notes

1. See Ann K. S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Nikki R. Keddie, "The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 and Its Political Impact," pp. 119-136 in *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society, Collected Essays* (London: Frank Cass, 1980); Willem M. Floor, "The Merchants (*tujār*) in Qājār Iran," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 126, no. 1 (1976): 101-35.

2. John Foran, "The Concept of Dependent Development as a Key to the Political Economy of Qajar Iran (1800-1925)," *Iranian Studies* 22, nos. 2-3 (1989): 5-56. Foran's essay is in part a response to an earlier study by Gad Gilbar in which Gilbar argued that the process of commercialization of agriculture brought higher yields for the economy as a whole and improved patterns of consumption for the majority of population, including the peasants, who now consumed more tea, sugar, opium, and tobacco. See Gad G. Gilbar, "Persian Agriculture in the Late Qajar Period, 1860-1906: Some Economic and Social Aspects," *Asian and African Studies* 12, no. 3 (1978): 313-65.

3. See Nikki R. Keddie, "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran," *Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society, Collected Essays* (London: Frank Cass, 1980), 53-65. This essay was originally published in 1966.

4. Gad G. Gilbar, "The Big Merchants (*tujār*) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906," *Asian and African Studies* 11, no. 3 (1977): 275-303.

5. Vanessa Martin, *Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989).

6. Said Amir Arjomand, "The Ulama's Traditionalist Opposition to Parliamentaryism: 1907-1909," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (April 1981): 177.

7. Faridun Adamiyyat, *Fikr-i Dimukrasi dar Nihzat-i Mashrutyyat-i Iran* (The idea of social democracy in the Iranian constitutional revolution) (Tehran: Payam, 1975); Mansureh Itihadiyah Nizam Mafi, *Paydayish va Tahavvul-i Ahzab-i Siyasi-yi Mashrutyyat: Daureh-yi Avval va Duvvum* (The formation and development of political parties in Iran: The first and second constitutional periods) (Tehran: Gustareh, 1982); Mangol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

8. See E. G. Browne, *Material for the Study of the Babi Religion* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1918), 22; E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910); Nikki R. Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4 (1962): 266-95; Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "Al-Afghani"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983 [1968]).

9. Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution*, especially chap. 3.

10. By the term *Azari* I am referring to both Iranian Azarbaijanis and Muslims from the Russian Caucasus, present-day northern Azarbaijan, who were ethnically related and in many cases maintained familial ties with relatives in Iranian Azarbaijan. Such ties have been maintained to this day, though to a lesser extent than at the time of the Constitutional Revolution.

11. For an overview of these early *anjumans*, see Mangol Bayat, "Anjoman," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 2, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 77-88.
12. For a discussion of the Tabriz Anjuman, see Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-i Iran* (History of constitutionalism in Iran) (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1984 [1951]). See also Mansurah Rafi'i, *Anjuman* (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarikh-i Iran, 1983). For a general discussion of the *anjumans*, see Janet Afary, "Grassroots Democracy and Social Democracy in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-11" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Departments of History and Near East Studies, 1991).
13. See Hasan Hakimian, "Wage Labor and Migration: Persian Workers in Southern Russia, 1880-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 4 (1985): 443-52.
14. See Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-yi Iran*, 245.
15. See Janet Afary, "On the Origins of Feminism in Early 20th Century Iran," *Journal of Women's History* 1, no. 2 (1989): 65-87; and Mangol Philipp Bayat, "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905-1911," in *Women in the Muslim World*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Lois Beck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 295-308.
16. See *Anjuman*, May 28, 1907. All translations from non-English works in this chapter are my own.
17. Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-yi Iran*, 390-91.
18. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*.
19. *Anjuman*, September 2, 1907.
20. See Adamiyyat, *Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtima'i*, 65-92; Janet Afary, "Peasant Rebellions of the Caspian Region in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23 (May 1991): 137-61.
21. *Majlis*, April 8, 1907.
22. For a summary discussion of the abolition of *uyyuls*, see Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-yi Iran*, 228-29.
23. See *Habl al-Matin*, January 13, 1908.
24. See "Statut de la Section Iranienne de l'Association de Mojahid Formée à Meched," in *La Social-démocratie en Iran*, ed. Cosroe Chaqueri (Florence: Mazdak, 1979), 161-74.
25. See the report in *Habl al-Matin*, December 28, 1907.
26. *Great Britain: Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia*, Cd. 4581, no. 106 (February 28, 1908); *Great Britain: Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia*, Cd. 4581, no. 107 (March 26, 1908).
27. Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-yi Iran*, 727.
28. See Andre Amuriyan, *Hamasah-yi Yiprim* (The Epic of Yephrem) (Tehran: Javidan, 1976), 28.
29. See Cosroe Chaqueri, ed., *La Social-démocratie en Iran* (Florence: Mazdak, 1979), 233.
30. See Georges Haupt and Madeleine Reberlioux, *La Deuxième Internationale et l'Oriente* (Paris: Cujas, 1967), 63-64.
31. Quoted by V. I. Lenin, "Events in the Balkans and in Persia," in *Collected Works*, vol. 15 (Moscow: Progress, 1978), 226.
32. See A. Chalangarian, "Iranians' Letter to Kautsky," ed. Cosroe Chaqueri, in *Lenin's Struggle for a Revolutionary International: Documents 1907-1916*, ed. John Riddell (New York: Monad, 1984), 60-61.
33. He made no mention of Marx's famous 1850 "Address of the Central Authority to the League," however, in which, after the defeat of the revolution, Marx emphatically called for the formation of an independent workers' party: see "Karl Kautsky's Reply," in *Lenin's*

*Struggle for a Revolutionary International: Documents 1907-1916*, ed. John Riddell (New York: Monad, 1984), 62-63; Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Authority to the League, March 1850," in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 10 (New York: International, 1978), 277-87.

34. For a discussion of some of these differences among European social democrats, particularly during the 1907 London Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, where the ramifications of the Russian revolution of 1905 were analyzed, and for Rosa Luxemburg's position, see Raya Dunayevskaya, *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982), 1-15, 199-206.

35. Cosroe Chaqueri, whose documentary collections have contributed much to our understanding of social democracy in this period, argues that they were the same person. See Chaqueri, "The Role and Impact of Armenian Intellectuals in Iranian Politics, 1905-11," *Armenian Review* 41 (Summer 1988): 1-51.

36. See "Protocole no. 1 de la Conférence des Social-Démocrates de Tabriz, 1908," in Chaqueri, *La Social-démocratie en Iran*, 35-36.

37. *Ibid.*

38. See "Khacaturian à G. Plekhanov," in Chaqueri, *La Social-démocratie en Iran*, 39; "A. Tchilinkirian à G. Plekhanov," in Chaqueri, *La Social-démocratie en Iran*, 51. Throughout this chapter I have adopted the English rather than the French transliterations of these Armenian names.

39. See "Khacaturian à G. Plekhanov," 38-43.

40. See Tigran Darvish, "Iran's Revolution," in *Asnad-i Tarikhi-yi Junbish-i Kargari, Susial Dimukrasi va Kumunisti-yi Iran* (Historical documents of the workers, social democracy, and communist movement in Iran), vol. 19, ed. Cosroe Chaqueri (Tehran: Padzahr, 1985), 31; originally published as "Die Persische Revolution," *Neue Zeit* 27, no. 20.

41. A. Chalangarian, "Iqtisad va Rishliha-yi Ijtima'i-yi Inqilabi-yi Iran" (Economic and social roots of the Iranian revolution), in *Asnad-i Tarikhi-yi Junbish-i Kargari, Susial Dimukrasi va Kumunisti-yi Iran* (Historical documents of the workers, social democracy, and communist movement in Iran), vol. 19, ed. Cosroe Chaqueri (Tehran: Padzahr, 1985), 62; originally published in *Neue Zeit* 28, no. 34.

42. M. Malikzada, *Tarikh-i Inqilab-i Mashruteh-yi Iran* (History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution), vol. 6 (Tehran: Ilmi, 1979), 1335.

43. For documents confirming this close relation, see Iraj Afshar, ed., *Awraq-i Tazah-yab-i Mashrutiyat va Naqsh-i Taqizadeh* (Newly found papers of the constitutional era and the role of Taqizadeh) (Tehran: Javidan, 1980), 239-40. See also Chaqueri, "The Role and Impact of Armenian Intellectuals," as well as the discussion of this issue in Afary, "Grassroots Democracy," chap. 8.

44. *Iran-i Nau*, March 10, 1911, 1-2.

45. Afshar, *Awraq-i Tazahyab*, 230-31, 207-8.

46. Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Hijdahsleh-yi Azarbaijan* (Eighteen-year history of Azarbaijan), vol. 1 (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1978), 132-33.

47. *Great Britain: Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia*, Cd. 5120 no. 173 (September 9, 1910).

48. Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Hijdahsleh*, 139-44.

49. Isma'il Amirkhizi, *Qiyam-i Azarbaijan va Sattar Khan* (The uprising of Azarbaijan and Sattar Khan) (Tehran: Tehran, 1960), 574.